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In the TACITUS project for using commonsense knowledge in the understanding of texts about 
mechanical devices and their failures, we have been developing various commonsense theories that are 
needed to mediate between the way we talk about the behavior of such devices and causal models of their 
operation. Of central importance in this effort is the axiomatization of what might be called 
"commonsense metaphysics". This includes a number of areas that figure in virtually every domain of 
discourse, such as granularity, scales, time, space, material, physical objects, shape, causality, 
functionality, and force. Our effort has been to construct core theories of each of these areas, and then 
to define, or at least characterize, a large number of lexical items in terms provided by the core theories. 
In this paper we discuss our methodological principles and describe the key ideas in the various domains 
we are investigating. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the TACITUS project for using commonsense knowl- 
edge in the understanding of texts about mechanical 
devices and their failures, we have been developing 
various commonsense theories that are needed to me- 
diate between the way we talk about the behavior of 
such devices and causal models of their operation. Of 
central importance in this effort is the axiomatization f 
what might be called "commonsense metaphysics". 
This includes a number of areas that figure in virtually 
every domain of discourse, such as scalar notions, 
granularity, time, space, material, physical objects, 
causality, functionality, force, and shape. Our approach 
to lexical semantics i to construct core theories of each 
of these areas, and then to define, or at least character- 
ize, a large number of lexical items in terms provided by 
the core theories. In the TACITUS system, processes 
for solving pragmatics problems posed by a text will use 
the knowledge base consisting of these theories, in 
conjunction with the logical forms of the sentences in 
the text, to produce an interpretation. I  this paper we 
do not stress these interpretation processes; this is 
another, important aspect of the TACITUS project, and 
it will be described in subsequent papers (Hobbs and 
Martin, 1987). 
This work represents a convergence of research in 
lexical semantics in linguistics and efforts in artificial 
intelligence to encode commonsense knowledge. Over 
the years, lexical semanticists have developed formal- 
isms of increasing adequacy for encoding word mean- 
ing, progressing from simple sets of features (Katz and 
Fodor, 1963) to notations for predicate-argument struc- 
ture (Lakoff, 1972; Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976), but 
the early attempts till limited access to world knowl- 
edge and assumed only very restricted sorts of process- 
ing. Workers in computational linguistics introduced 
inference (Rieger, 1974; Schank, 1975) and other com- 
plex cognitive processes (Herskovits, 1982) into our 
understanding of the role of word meaning. Recently 
linguists have given greater attention to the cognitive 
processes that would operate on their representations 
(e.g., Talmy, 1983; Croft, 1986). Independently, in arti- 
ficial intelligence an effort arose to encode large amounts 
of commonsense knowledge (Hayes, 1979; Hobbs and 
Moore, 1985; Hobbs et al. 1985). The research reported 
here represents a convergence of these various devel- 
opments. By constructing core theories of certain fun- 
damental phenomena and defining lexical items within 
these theories, using the full power of predicate calcu- 
lus, we are able to cope with complexities of word 
meaning that have hitherto escaped lexical semanticists. 
Moreover, we can do this within a framework that gives 
full scope to the planning and reasoning processes that 
manipulate representations of word meaning. 
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In constructing the core theories we are attempting to 
adhere to several methodological principles: 
1. One should aim for characterization f concepts, 
rather than definition. One cannot generally expect to 
find necessary and sufficient conditions for a concept. 
The most we can hope for is to find a number of 
necessary conditions and a number of sufficient condi- 
tions. This amounts to saying that a great many predi- 
cates are primitives, but they are primitives that are 
highly interrelated with the rest of the knowledge base. 
2. One should determine the minimal structure nec- 
essary for a concept to make sense. In efforts to 
axiomatize an area, there are two positions one may 
take, exemplified by set theory and by group theory. In 
axiomatizing set theory, one attempts to capture xactly 
some concept hat one has strong intuitions about. If the 
axiomatization turns out to have unexpected models, 
this exposes an inadequacy. In group theory, by con- 
trast, one characterizes an abstract class of structures. 
If it turns out that there are unexpected models, this is 
a serendipitous discovery of a new phenomenon that we 
can reason about using an old theory. The pervasive 
character of metaphor in natural language discourse 
shows that our commonsense theories of the world 
ought to be much more like group theory than set 
theory. By seeking minimal structures in axiomatizing 
concepts, we optimize the possibilities of using the 
theories in metaphorical and analogical contexts. This 
principle is illustrated below in the section on regions. 
One consequence of this principle is that our approach 
will seem more syntactic than semantic. We have 
concentrated more on specifying axioms than on con- 
strncting models. Our view is that the chief role of 
models in our effort is for proving the consistency and 
independence of sets of axioms, and for showing their 
adequacy. As an example of the lastpoint, many of the 
spatial and temporal theories we construct are intended 
at least to have Euclidean space or the real numbers as 
one model, and a subclass of graph-theoretical struc- 
tures as other models. 
3. A balance must be struck between attempting to 
cover all cases and aiming only for the prototypical 
cases. In general, we have tried to cover as many cases 
as possible with an elegant axiomatization, in line with 
the two previous principles, but where the formalization 
begins to look baroque, we assume that higher pro- 
cesses will block some inferences in the marginal cases. 
We assume that inferences will be drawn in a controlled 
fashion. Thus, every outr6, highly context-dependent 
counterexample need not be accounted for, and to a 
certain extent, definitions can be geared specifically to a 
prototype. 
4. Where competing ontologies uggest themselves in
a domain, one should try to construct a theory that 
accommodates both. Rather than commit oneself to 
adopting one set of primitives rather than another, one 
should show how either set can be characterized in 
terms of the other. Generally, each of the ontologies is 
useful for different purposes, and it is convenient to be 
able to appeal to both. Our treatment of time illustrates 
this. 
5. The theories one constructs hould be richer in 
axioms than in theorems. In mathematics, one expects 
to state half a dozen axioms and prove dozens of 
theorems from them. In encoding commonsense knowl- 
edge, it seems to be just the opposite. The theorems we 
seek to prove on the basis of these axioms are theorems 
about specific situations that are to be interpreted, in 
particular, theorems about a text that the system is 
attempting to understand. 
6. One should avoid falling into "black holes".  There 
are a few "myster ious" concepts that crop up repeat- 
edly in the formalization of commonsense metaphysics. 
Among these are "re levant"  (that is, relevant o the 
task at hand) and "normat ive"  (that is, conforming to 
some norm or pattern). To insist upon giving a satisfac- 
tory analysis of these before using them in analyzing 
other concepts is to cross the event horizon that sepa- 
rates lexical semantics from philosophy. On the other 
hand, our experience suggests that to avoid their use 
entirely is crippling; the lexical semantics of a wide 
variety of other terms depends upon them. Instead, we 
have decided to leave them minimally analyzed for the 
moment and use them without scruple in the analysis of 
other commonsense concepts. This approach will allow 
us to accumulate many examples of the use of these 
mysterious concepts, and in the end, contribute to their 
successful analysis. The use of these concepts appears 
below in the discussions of the words " immediately" ,  
"sample" ,  and "operate" .  
We chose as an initial target he problem of encoding 
the commonsense knowledge that underlies the concept 
of "wear" ,  as in a part of a device wearing out. Our aim 
was to define "wear"  in terms of predicates character- 
ized elsewhere in the knowledge base and to be able to 
infer some consequences of wear. For something to 
wear, we decided, is for it to lose imperceptible bits of 
material from its surface due to abrasive action over 
time. One goal, which we have not yet achieved, is to be 
able to prove as a theorem that, since the shape of a part 
of a mechanical device is often functional and since loss 
of material can result in a change of shape, wear of a 
part of a device can cause the failure of the device as a 
whole. In addition, as we have proceeded, we have 
characterized a number of words found in a set of target 
texts, as it has become possible. 
We are encoding the knowledge as axioms in what is 
for the most part a first-order logic, described by Hobbs 
(1985a), although quantification over predicates is 
sometimes convenient. In the formalism there is a 
nominalization operator . . . . .  for reifying events and 
conditions, as expressed in the following axiom schema: 
(Vx)p(x) =- (3e)p'(e,x) A Exist(e) 
That is, p is true of x if and only if there is a condition 
e o fp ' s  being true o fx  and e exists in the real world. 
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In our implementation so far, we have been proving 
simple theorems from our axioms using the CG5 theo- 
rem-prover developed by Mark Stickel (1982), and we 
are now beginning to use the knowledge base in text 
processing. 
2 REQUIREMENTS ON ARGUMENTS OF PREDICATES 
There is a notational convention used below that de- 
serves some explanation. It has frequently been noted 
that relational words in natural anguage can take only 
certain types of words as their arguments. These are 
usually described as selectional constraints. The same is 
true of predicates in our knowledge base. The con- 
straints are expressed below by rules of the form 
p(x,y) : r(x,y) 
This means that for p even to make sense applied to x 
and y, it must be the case that r is true of x and y. The 
logical import of this rule is that wherever there is an 
axiom of the form 
(V x,y)p(x,y) D q(x,y) 
this is really to be read as 
(V x,y)p(x,y) /% r(x,y) ~ q(x,y) 
The checking of selectional constraints, therefore, 
emerges as a by-product of other logical operations: the 
constraint r(x,y) must be verified if anything else is to be 
proved from p(x,y). 
The simplest example of such an r(x,y) is a conjunc- 
tion of sort constraints rl(x)/% r2(y). Our approach is a 
generalization of this, because much more complex 
requirements can be placed on the arguments. Con- 
sider, for example, the verb "range".  I fx  ranges from y 
to z, there must be a scale s that includes y and z, and x 
must be a set of entities that are located at various 
places on the scale. This can be represented as follows: 
range(x,y,z) : (3 s) [scale(s)/% y E s/% z E s/% set(x) 
/% (V u)[u ~ x D (3 v) v E s/% at(u,v)]] 
3 THE KNOWLEDGE BASE 
3.1 SETS AND GRANULARITY 
At the foundation of the knowledge base is an axioma- 
tization of set theory. It follows the standard Zermelo- 
Fraenkel approach, except that there is no axiom of 
infinity. 
Since so many concepts used in discourse are grain- 
dependent, a theory of granularity is also fundamental 
(see Hobbs 1985b). A grain is defined in terms of an 
indistinguishability relation, which is reflexive and sym- 
metric, but not necessarily transitive. One grain can be 
a ref inement of another, with the obvious definition. 
The most refined grain is the identity grain, i.e., the one 
in which every two distinct elements are distinguish- 
able. One possible relationship between two grains, one 
of which is a refinement of the other, is what we call an 
"Archimedean relation", after the Archimedean prop- 
erty of real numbers. Intuitively, if enough events occur 
that are imperceptible at the coarser grain g2 but per- 
ceptible at the finer grain g~, the aggregate will eventu- 
ally be perceptible at the coarser grain. This is an 
important property in phenomena subject to the heap 
paradox. Wear, for instance, eventually has significant 
consequences. 
3.2 SCALES 
A great many of the most common words in English 
have scales as their subject matter. This includes many 
prepositions, the most common adverbs, comparatives, 
and many abstract verbs. When spatial vocabulary is 
used metaphorically, it is generally the scalar aspect Of 
space that carries over to the target domain. A scale is 
defined as a set of elements, together with a partial 
ordering and a granularity (or an indistinguishability 
relation). The partial ordering and the indistinguishabil- 
ity relation are consistent with each other: 
(Vx ,y ,z )  x < y A y ~ z D x < zV  x ~ z 
That is, i fx is less than y and y is indistinguishable from 
z, then either x is less than z or x is indistinguishable 
from z. 
It is useful to have an adjacency relation between 
points on a scale, and there are a number of ways we 
could introduce it. We could simply take it to be 
primitive; in a scale having a distance function, we 
could define two points to be adjacent when the distance 
between them is less than some E; finally, we could 
define adjacency in terms of the grain size for the scale: 
(V x,y,s) adj(x,y,s) =- 
(3z) Z - s  X /% Z - s  y /% ~ [x - s Y], 
That is, distinguishable elements x and y are adjacent on 
scale s if and only if there is an element z which is 
indistinguishable from both. 
Two important possible properties of scales are con- 
nectedness and denseness. We can say that two ele- 
ments of a scale are connected by a chain of adj 
relations: 
(Vx,y,s)connected(x,y,s)  - 
adj(x,y,s) V (3z)adj(x,z,s) /% connected(z,y,s)  
A scale is connected (sconnected) if all pairs of elements 
are connected. A scale is dense if between any two 
points there is a third point, until the two points are so 
close together that the grain size no longer allows us to 
determine whether such an intermediate point exists. 
Cranking up the magnification could well resolve the 
continuous pace into a discrete set, as objects into 
atoms. 
(Vs)dense(s) =- 
(Vx,y)x E s /% y E s /% x <s y 
D(3z)(x <s z/% z <s Y) V (3z)(x ~s  z/% z ~s  Y) 
This expresses the commonsense notion of continuity. 
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A subscale of a scale has as its elements a subset of 
the elements of the scale and has as its partial ordering 
and its grain the partial ordering and the grain of the 
scale. 
(V sx,s2)subscale(s2,s 0 = subset(s2,s 0 
A (Vx,y)[[x <sl Y =- x <s2 Y] A [x ~sl Y -~ x ~s2 Y]] 
An interval can be defined as a connected subscale: 
(Vi)interval(i) =- (3s)scale(s) 
A subscale(i,s) A sconnected(i) 
The relations between time intervals that Allen and 
Kautz (1985) have defined can be defined in a straight- 
forward manner in the approach presented here, but for 
intervals in general. 
A concept closely related to scales is that of a 
"cyc le" .  This is a system that has a natural ordering 
locally but contains a loop globally. Examples are the 
color wheel, clock times, and geographical locations 
ordered by "east of" .  We have axiomatized cycles in 
terms of a ternary between relation whose axioms 
parallel those for a partial ordering. 
The figure-ground relationship is of fundamental im- 
portance in language. We encode it with the primitive 
predicate at. It is possible that the minimal structure 
necessary for something to be a ground is that of a scale; 
hence, this is a selectional constraint on the arguments 
of at. 1 
at(x,y) : (3s)y E s A scale(s) 
At this point, we are already in a position to define some 
fairly complex words. As an illustration, we give the 
example of " range"  as in "x  ranges from y to z": 
(Vx,y,z)range(x,y,z) =- 
(3s,st,ut,uz)scale(s) A subscale(sl,s ) 
A bottom(y,s 0 A top(z,sO 
Au I E x A at(ut,y ) A u 2 E x A at(u2,z) 
A (Vu)[u ~ x ~ (3v)v ~ s I A at(u,v)] 
That is, x ranges from y to z if and only i fy and z are the 
bottom and top o fa  subscale s~ of some scale s and x is 
a set which has elements at y and z and all of whose 
elements are located at points on s~. 
A very important scale is the linearly ordered scale of 
numbers. We do not plan to reason axiomatically about 
numbers, but it is useful in natural anguage processing 
to have encoded a few facts about numbers. For exam- 
ple, a set has a cardinality which is an element of the 
number scale. 
Verticality is a concept hat would most properly be 
analyzed in the section on space, but it is a property that 
many other scales have acquired metaphorically, for 
whatever eason. The number scale is one of these. 
Even in the absence of an analysis of verticality, it is a 
However, we are currently examining an approach inwhich a more 
abstract oncept, "system", discussed inSection 3.6.3, is taken to be 
the minimal structure for expressing location. 
useful property to have as a primitive in lexical seman- 
tics. 
The word "h igh" is a vague term asserting that an 
entity is in the upper region of some scale. It requires 
that the scale be a vertical one, such as the number 
scale. The verticality requirement distinguishes "h igh" 
from the more general term "very" ;  we can say "very  
hard" but not "highly hard".  The phrase "highly 
planar" sounds all right because the high register of 
"planar" suggests a quantifiable, scientific accuracy, 
whereas the low register of "f lat" makes "highly flat" 
sound much worse. 
The test of any definition is whether it allows one to 
draw the appropriate inferences. In our target exts, the 
phrase "high usage" occurs. Usage is a set of using 
events, and the verticality requirement on "h igh" 
forces us to coerce the phrase into "a  high or large 
number of using events".  Combining this with an axiom 
stating that the use of a mechanical device involves the 
likelihood of abrasive events, as defined below, and 
with the definition of "wear"  in terms of abrasive 
events, we should be able to conclude the likelihood of 
wear. 
3.3 TIME: TWO ONTOLOGIES 
There are two possible ontologies for time. In the first, 
the one most acceptable to the mathematically minded, 
there is a time line, which is a scale having some 
topological structure. We can stipulate the time line to 
be linearly ordered (although it is not in approaches that 
build ignorance of relative times into the representation 
of time (e.g., Hobbs, 1974) nor in approaches employing 
branching futures (e.g., McDermott, 1985)), and we can 
stipulate it to be dense (although it is not in the situation 
calculus). We take before to be the ordering on the time 
line: 
(V q ,t2)bef ore( q ,t2) =- 
(3T)Time-line(T) A t I ~ T A t 2 E T A t I < T t2 
We allow both instants and intervals of time. Most 
events occur at some instant or during some interval. In 
this approach, nearly every predicate takes a time 
argument. 
In the second ontology, the one that seems to be 
more deeply rooted in language, the world consists of a 
large number of more or less independent processes, or 
histories, or sequences of events. There is a primitive 
relation change between conditions. Thus, 
change(e 1,e2) A p'(e Z,x) A q'(ez,x ) 
says that there is a change from the condition el o fp ' s  
being true of x to the condition e 2 of q's being true of x. 
The time line in this ontology is then an artificial 
construct, a regular sequence of imagined abstract 
events (think of them as ticks of a clock in the National 
Bureau of Standards) to which other events can be 
related. The change ontology seems to correspond to 
the way we experience the world. We recognize rela- 
tions of causality, change of state, and copresence 
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among events and conditions. When events are not 
related in these ways, judgments of relative time must 
be mediated by copresence r lations between the events 
and events on a clock and change of state relations on 
the clock. 
The predicate change possesses a limited transitiv- 
ity. There has been a change from Reagan's being an 
actor to Reagan's being president, even though he was 
governor in between. But we probably do not want to 
say there has been a change from Reagan's being an 
actor to Margaret Thatcher's being prime minister, even 
though the second event comes after the first. 
In this ontology, we can say that any two times, 
viewed as events, always have a change relation be- 
tween them. 
(Vq,ta)before(tl,t 2) D change(tl,t2) 
The predicate change is related to before by the axiom 
(Vel,e2) change(el,e2) D 
(:ltl,t2) at(el,t 0 A at(e2,t 2) A before(tl,t2) 
That is, if there is a change from e 1 to e 2, then there is 
a time t I at which e I occurred and a time t 2 at which e 2 
occurred, and t~ is before t 2. This does not allow us to 
derive change of state from temporal succession. For 
this, we would need axioms of the form 
(Vel,e2,tl,t2,x) p'(el,x ) A at(el,t 0 
A q'(ez,x ) A at(e2,t2) A before(t 1,t 2) 
D change(el,e 2)
That is, if x is p at time t~ and q at a later time t 2, then 
there has been a change of state from one to the other. 
This axiom would not necessarily be true for all p's and 
q's. Time arguments in predications can be viewed as 
abbreviations: 
(V x,t)p(x,t) - (3e)p'(e,x) A at(e,t) 
The word "move" ,  or the predicate move, (as in "x  
moves from y to z") can then be defined equivalently in 
terms of change, 
(V x,y,z)move(x,y,z) =-
(=lel,e2) change(el,e2) A at'(el,x,y) A at'(ez,X,Z) 
or in terms of the time line, 
(V x,y,z) move(x,y,z) =- 
(3q,t2) at(x,y,t 0 A at(x,z,tz) A before(tl,t2) 
(The latter definition has to be complicated a bit to 
accommodate cyclic motion. The former axiom is all 
right as it stands, provided there is also an axiom saying 
that for there to be a change from a state to the same 
state, there must be an intermediate different state.) 
In English and apparently all other natural anguages, 
both ontologies are represented in the lexicon. The time 
line ontology is found in clock and calendar terms, tense 
systems of verbs, and in the deictic temporal locatives 
such as "yesterday" ,  " today" ,  " tomorrow" ,  "last 
night", and so on. The change ontology is exhibited in 
most verbs, and in temporal clausal connectives. The 
universal presence in natural anguages of both classes 
of lexical items and grammatical markers requires a 
theory that can accommodate both ontologies, illustrat- 
ing the importance of methodological principle 4. 
Among temporal connectives, the word "whi le"  
presents interesting problems. In "e  I while e2", e2 must 
be an event occurring over a time interval; el must be an 
event and may occur either at a point or over an 
interval. One's first guess is that the point or interval for 
el must be included in the interval for % However,  
there are cases, such as 
The electricity should be off while the switch is being 
repaired. 
which suggest he reading "e  2 is included in e l " .  We 
came to the conclusion that one can infer no more than 
that el and e 2 overlap, and any tighter constraints result 
from implicatures from background knowledge. 
The word " immediately",  as in "immediately after 
the alarm", also presents a number of problems. It 
requires its argument e to be an ordering relation 
between two entities x and y on some scale s. 
immediate(e) : (3x,y,s)less-than'(e,x,y,s) 
It is not clear what the constraints on the scale are. 
Temporal and spatial scales are acceptable, as in "im- 
mediately after the alarm" and "immediately to the 
left", but the size scale is not: 
* John is immediately larger than Bill. 
Etymologically, it means that there are no intermediate 
entities between x and y on s. Thus, 
(Ve,x,y,s) immediate(e) A less-than'(e,x,y,s) 
D --1 (3z)less-than(x,z,s) A less-than(z,y,s) 
However, this will only work if we restrict z to be a 
relevant entity. For example, in the sentence 
We disengaged the compressor immediately after the 
alarm. 
the implication is that no event that could damage the 
compressor occurred between the alarm and the disen- 
gagement, since the text is about equipment failure. 
3.4 SPACES AND DIMENSION: THE MINIMAL STRUCTURE 
The notion of dimension has been made precise in linear 
algebra. Since the concept of a region is used metaphor- 
ically as well as in the spatial sense, however, we were 
concerned to determine the minimal structure a system 
requires for it to make sense to call it a space of more 
than one dimension. For a two-dimensional space, there 
must be a scale, or partial ordering, for each dimension. 
Moreover, the two scales must be independent, in that 
the order of elements on one scale can not be deter- 
mined from their order on the other. Formally, 
(V sp)space(sp) =- 
(:lSl,S2) scalel(sl,sP) A scale2(s2,sp) 
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Figure 1.1 The Simplest Space. 
A (3x)[(3yt) [x <s, Yi A x <s2 Yl] 
A (::ly2)[x <s, A Yz A Y2 <s2 x]] 
Note that this does not allow <,2 to be simply the 
reverse of <s.  An unsurprising consequence of this 
definition is that the minimal example of a two-dimen- 
sional space consists of three points (three points deter- 
mine a plane), e.g., the points A, B, and C, where 
A<IB ,  A<IC ,  C<2A,  A<2 B. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
The dimensional scales are apparently found in all 
natural languages in relevant domains. The familiar 
three-dimensional space of common sense can be de- 
fined by the three scale pairs "up-down", "front- 
back", and "left-right"; the two-dimensional plane of 
the commonsense conception of the earth's urface is 
represented by the two scale pairs "north-south" and 
"east -west" .  
The simplest, although not the only, way to define 
adjacency in the space is as adjacency on both scales: 
(Vx, y,sp )adj(x, y ,sp ) =-- 
(3si,s2) scalel(si,sp) A scale2(s2,sp) 
A adj(x,y,sl) A adj(x,y, sz) 
A region is a subset of a space. The surface and interior 
of a region can be defined in terms of adjacency, in a 
manner paralleling the definition of a boundary in point- 
set topology. In the following, s is the boundary or 
surface of a two- or three-dimensional region r embed- 
ded in a space sp. 
(V s,r, sp)surface(s,r, sp) 
(Vx)x ~ r ~ [x ~ s =- 
(Ey)(y ~ sp A -1 (y E r) A adj(x,y,sp))] 
Finally, we can define the notion of "contact" in terms 
of points in different regions being adjacent: 
(V rl,r2,sp)contact(r 1, r2,sP) - 
disjoint(r 1,r2) A (3 x,y)(x ~ r I A y ~ r 2 A adj(x,y,sp)) 
By picking the scales and defining adjacency right, we 
can talk about points of contact between communica- 
tion networks, systems of knowledge, and other meta- 
phorical domains. By picking the scales to be the real 
line and defining adjacency in terms of eneighborhoods, 
we get Euclidean space and can talk about contact 
between physical objects. 
3.5 MATERIAL 
Physical objects and materials must be distinguished, 
just as they are in apparently every natural language, by 
means of the count noun-mass noun distinction. A 
physical object is not a bit of material, but rather is 
composed of a bit of material at any given time. Thus, 
rivers and human bodies are physical objects, even 
though their material constitution changes over time. 
This distinction also allows us to talk about an object's 
losing material through wear and still remaining the 
same object. 
We will say that an entity b is a bit of material by 
means of the expression material(b). Bits of material are 
characterized by both extension and cohesion. The 
primitive predication occupies(b,r, t)encodes extension, 
saying that a bit of material b occupies a region r at time 
t. The topology of a bit of material is then parasitic on 
the topology of the region it occupies. A part b~ of a bit 
of material b is a bit of material whose occupied region 
is always a subregion of the region occupied by b. 
Point-like particles (particle) are defined in terms of 
points in the occupied region, disjoint bits (disjointbit) 
in terms of the disjointness of regions, and contact 
between bits in terms of contact between their regions. 
We can then state as follows the principle of non-joint- 
occupancy that two bits of material cannot occupy the 
same place at the same time: 
(V b 1 , bz)(disjointbit(b I ,b2) 
D(V x,y,b3,b4) interior(b3,b 0 A interior(b4,b2) 
A particle(x, b3) A particle(y, b4) 
D --1 (3z)(at(x, z) A at(y, z)) 
That is, if bits b 1 and b 2 are disjoint, then there is no 
entity z that is at interior points in both bl and b2. At 
some future point in our work, this may emerge as a 
consequence of a richer theory of cohesion and force. 
The cohesion of materials is also a primitive prop- 
erty, for we must distinguish between a bump on the 
surface of an object and a chip merely lying on the 
surface. Cohesion depends on a primitive relation bond 
between particles of material, paralleling the role of adj 
in regions. The relation attached is defined as the 
transitive closure of bond. A topology of cohesion is 
built up in a manner analogous to the topology of 
regions. In addition, we have encoded the relation that 
bond bears to motion, i.e., that bonded bits remain 
adjacent and that one moves when the other does, and 
the relation of bond to force, i.e, that there is a 
characteristic force that breaks a bond in a given 
material. 
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Different materials react in different ways to forces of 
various strengths. Materials subjected to force exhibit 
or fail to exhibit several invariance properties, proposed 
by Hager (1985). If the material is shape-invariant with 
respect to a particular force, its shape remains the same. 
If it is topologically invariant, particles that are adjacent 
remain adjacent. Shape invariance implies topological 
invariance. If subjected to forces of a certain strength or 
degree dl, a material ceases being shape-invariant. At a 
force of strength dz >-- d~, it ceases being topologically 
invariant, and at a force of strength d3 ~ d 2, it simply 
breaks. Metals exhibit he full range of possibilities, that 
is, 0 < d~ < d2 < d3 < oo. For forces of strength d < d~, 
the material is "hard";  for forces of strength d where d~ 
< d < d2, it is "flexible"; for forces of strength d where 
d2 < d < d3, it is "malleable". Words such as "ductile" 
and "elastic" can be defined in terms of this vocabu- 
lary, together with predicates about he geometry of the 
bit of material. Words such as "brittle" (dl = d2 = d3) 
and "fluid" (d2 = 0, d3 = oo) can also be defined in these 
terms. While we should not expect o be able to define 
various material terms, like "metal" and "ceramic", 
we can certainly characterize many of their properties 
with this vocabulary. 
Because of its invariance properties, material inter- 
acts with containment and motion. The word "clog" 
illustrates this. The predicate clog is a three-place 
relation: x clogs y against the flow of z. It is the 
obstruction by x of z's motion through y, but with the 
selectional restriction that z must be something that can 
flow, such as a liquid, gas, or powder. If a rope is 
passing through ahole in a board, and a knot in the rope 
prevents it from going through, we do not say that the 
hole is clogged. On the other hand, there do not seem to 
be any selectional constraints on x. In particular, x can 
be identical with z: glue, sand, or molasses can clog a 
passageway against its own flow. We can speak of 
clogging where the obstruction of flow is not complete, 
but it must be thought of as "nearly" complete. 
3.6 OTHER DOMAINS 
3.6.1 CAUSAL CONNECTION 
Attachment within materials is one variety of causal 
connection. In general, if two entities x and y are 
causally connected with respect o some behavior p of 
x, then whenever p happens to x, there is some corre- 
sponding behavior q that happens to y. In the case of 
attachment, p and q are both move.  A particularly 
common kind of causal connection between two entities 
is one mediated by the motion of a third entity from one 
to the other. (This might be called a "vector boson" 
connection.) Photons mediating the connection between 
the sun and our eyes, raindrops connecting a state of the 
clouds with the wetness of our skin and clothes, a virus 
being transmitted from one person to another, and 
utterances passing between people are all examples of 
such causal connections. Barriers, openings, and pene- 
tration are all defined with respect o paths of causal 
connection. 
3.6.2 FORCE 
The concept of "force" is axiomatized, in a way 
consistent with Talmy's treatment (1985), in terms of 
the predications force(a,b,dO and resist(b,a,d2) ~ a 
forces against b with strength dl and b resists a's action 
with strength d2. We can infer motion from facts about 
relative strength. This treatment can also be specialized 
to Newtonian force, where we have not merely move- 
ment, but acceleration. In addition, in spaces in which 
orientation is defined, forces can have an orientation, 
and a version of the "parallelogram of forces" law can 
be encoded. Finally, force interacts with shape in ways 
characterized by words like "stretch", "compress", 
"bend",  "twist", and "shear".  
3.6.3 SYSTEMS AND FUNCTIONALITY 
An important concept is the notion of a "system", 
which is a set of entities, a set of their properties, and a 
set of relations among them. A common kind of system 
is one in which the entities are events and conditions 
and the relations are causal and enabling relations. A 
mechanical device can be described as such a system 
in a sense, in terms of the plan it executes in its 
operation. The funct ion of various parts and of condi- 
tions of those parts is then the role they play in this 
system, or plan. 
The intransitive sense of "operate",  as in 
The diesel was operating. 
involves systems and functionality. If an entity x oper- 
ates, there must be a larger system sof  which x is a part. 
The entity x itself is a system with parts. These parts 
undergo normative state changes, thereby causing x to 
undergo normative state changes, thereby causing x to 
produce an effect with a normative function in the larger 
system s. The concept of "normative" is discussed 
below. 
3.6.4 SHAPE 
We have been approaching the problem of characteriz- 
ing shape from a number of different angles. The 
classical treatment of shape is via the notion of "simi- 
larity" in Euclidean geometry, and in Hilbert's formal 
reconstruction of Euclidean geometry (Hilbert, 1902) 
the key primitive concept seems to be that of "con- 
gruent angles". Therefore, we first sought o develop a
theory of "orientation". The shape of an object can 
then be characterized in terms of changes in orientation 
of a tangent as one moves about on the surface of the 
object, as is done in some vision research (e.g., Zahn 
and Roskies, 1972). In all of this, since "shape" can be 
used loosely and metaphorically, one question we are 
asking is whether some minimal, abstract structure can 
be found in which the notion of "shape" makes sense. 
Consider, for instance, a graph in which one scale is 
discrete, or even unordered. Accordingly, we have been 
examining a number of examples, asking when it seems 
right to say two structures have different shapes. 
We have also examined the interactions of shape and 
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functionality (see Davis, 1984). What seems to be 
crucial is how the shape of an obstacle constrains the 
motion of a substance or of an object of a particular 
shape (see Shoham, 1985). Thus, a funnel concentrates 
the flow of a liquid, and similarly, a wedge concentrates 
force. A box pushed against a ridge in the floor will 
topple, and a rotating wheel is a limiting case of contin- 
uous toppling. 
3.7 HITTING, ABRASION, WEAR, AND RELATED CONCEPTS 
For x to hit y is for x to move into contact with y with 
some force. 
The basic scenario for an abrasive vent is that there 
is an impinging bit of  material m that hits an object 0 and 
by doing so removes a pointlike bit of material bo from 
the surface of o: 
abr-event'(e,m,o,bo) : material(m ) 
A (Vt) at(e,t) D topologically-invariant(o,t) 
(V e,m,o, bo)abr-event'(e,m,o,bo) =- 
(3 t,b,s,ez,e2,e3) at(e,t) A consists-of(o,b,t) 
A surface(s,b) A particle(bo,s ) A change'(e,el,e 2) 
A attached'(el,bo,b ) A not'(ez,e 0 A cause(es,e ) 
A hit'(e3,m,bo) 
That is, e is an abrasive vent of a material m impinging 
on a topologically invariant object 0 and detaching bo if 
and only if b 0 is a particle of the surface s of the bit of 
material material b of which 0 consists at the time t at 
which e occurs, and e is a change from the condition el 
of bo's being attached to b to the negation e 2 of that 
condition, where the change is caused by the hitting e 3 
of m against b o. 
After the abrasive event, the pointlike bit bo is no 
longer a part of the object o: 
(Ve, m, o, b 0 , e t, e2, tz)abr- e vent'(e, m, o, b o) 
A change'(e,e Z,ez) A at(e2,t2) 
A consists-ojffo, b2,t2) 
D ~ part(bo,b2) 
That is, if e is an abrasive vent of m impinging against 
0 and detaching bo, and e is a change from e~ to e2, and 
e2 holds at time tz, then b 0 is not part of the bit of 
material b 2 of which 0 consists at t 2. It is necessary to 
state this explicitly since objects and bits of material can 
be discontinuous. 
An abrasion is a large set of abrasive events widely 
distributed through some nonpointlike region on the 
surface of an object: 
(V e,m,o) abrade'(e,m,o) =-- 
(3 bs)large(bs) 
A [(Vet)[e I E e D (:1 bo)b 0 E bs A abr-event'(et,m,o,bo) ] 
A (Vb,s,t)[at(e,t) A consists-of(o,b,t) A surface(s,b) 
D (3r) subregion(r,s) A widely-distributed(bs,r)]] 
That is, e is an abrasion by m of o if and only if there is 
a large set bs of bits of material and e is a set of abrasive 
events in which m impinges on o and removes a bit bo, 
an element in bs, from o, and if e occurs at time t and o 
consists of material b at time t, then there is a subregion 
r of the surface s of b over which bs is widely distrib- 
uted. 
Wear can result from a large collection of abrasive 
events distributed over time as well as space (so that 
there may be no instant at which enough abrasive 
events occur to count as an abrasion). Thus, the link 
between wear and abrasion is via the common notion of 
abrasive vents, not via a definition of wear in terms of 
abrasion. 
(V e,m,o) wear'(e,m,o) -- 
(3bs) large(bs) 
A [(Vet)[e t E e 
D (3 bo)b o ~ bs A abr-event'(e l,m,o,bo)] 
A (3i)[interval(i) A widely-distributed(e,i)]] 
That is, e is a wearing by x of o if and only if there is a 
large set bs of bits of material and e is a set of abrasive 
events in which m impinges on o and removes a bit bo, 
an element in bs, from o, and e is widely distributed 
over some time interval i. 
We have not yet characterized the concept " large" ,  
but we anticipate that it would be similar to "h igh".  The 
concept "widely distributed" concerns systems. I f  x is 
distributed in y, then y is a system and x is a set of 
entities which are located at components of y. For the 
distribution to be wide, most of the elements of a 
partition of y, determined independently of the distribu- 
tion, must contain components which have elements of 
x at them. 
The word "wear"  is one of a large class of other 
events involving cumulative, gradual oss of material w 
events described by words like "ch ip" ,  "cor rode" ,  
"f i le",  "e rode" ,  "sand" ,  "gr ind" ,  "weather" ,  " rus t " ,  
" tarnish",  "eat  away" ,  " ro t " ,  and "decay" .  All of  
these lexical items can now be defined as variations on 
the definition of "wear" ,  since we have built up the 
axiomatizations underlying "wear" .  We are now in a 
position to characterize the entire class. We will illus- 
trate this by defining two different ypes of variants of 
"wear" - - "ch ip"  and "cor rode" .  
"Ch ip"  differs from "wear"  in three ways: the bit of 
material removed in one abrasive vent is larger (it need 
not be point-like), it need not happen because of a 
material hitting against he object, and "ch ip"  does not 
require (though it does permit) a large collection of such 
events: one can say that some object is chipped even if 
there is one chip in it. Thus, we slightly alter the 
definition of abr-event o accommodate these changes: 
(V e,m,o ,bo)chip ' ( e ,m,o, bo) -~ 
(3t, b,s, el,e2,e3)at(e,t ) A consists-of(o,b,t) 
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/~ surface(s,b) /~ part(bo,s) /~ change'(e,el,ez) 
/~ attached'(el,bo,b) /~ not'(e2,e O
That is, e is a chipping event by a material m of a bit of 
material bo from an object o if and only if bo is a part of 
the surface s of the bit of material material b of which o 
consists at the time t at which e occurs, and e is a 
change from the condition el of bo's being attached to b 
to the negation e2 of that condition. 
"Corrode"  differs from "wear"  in that the bit of 
material is chemically transformed as well as being 
detached by the contact event; in fact, in some way the 
chemical transformation causes the detachment. This 
can be captured by adding a condition to the abrasive 
event that renders it a (single) corrode event: 
corrode-event(m, o, b o) : fluid(m) 
/~ contact(m,b o) 
(V e,m,o,b o) corrode-event'(e,m,o,bo) =-- 
(3 t,b,s,el,e2,e 3) at(e,t) /~ consists-of(o,b,t) 
/~ surface(s,b) /~ particle(bo,s) /~ change'(e,ei,e 2) 
/~ attached'(el,bo,b) /~ not'(e2,e 0/~ cause(ea,e) 
/~ chemical-change'(e3,m,b o) 
That is, e is a corrosive event by a fluid m of a bit of 
material bo with which it is in contact if and only if b 0 is 
a particle of the surface s of the bit of material b of 
which 0 consists at the time t at which e occurs, and e 
is a change from the condition e~ of bo's being attached 
to b to the negation e 2 of that condition, where the 
change is caused by a chemical reaction e3 of m with bo. 
"Corrode"  itself may be defined in a parallel fashion 
to "wear" ,  by substituting corrode-event for abr-event. 
All of this suggests the generalization that abrasive 
events, chipping and corrode events all detach the bit in 
question, and that we may describe all of these as 
detaching events. We can then generalize the above 
axiom about abrasive events that result in loss of 
material to the following axiom about detaching: 
(V e,m,o,bo,el,e2,t2) detach'(e,m,o,bo) 
/~ change'(e,el,e2) /~at(e2,t 2) /~ consists-of(o,t2,b ) 
D --7 part(bo,b2) 
That is, if e is a detaching event by m of b 0 from o, and 
e is a change from e I to e 2, and e 2 holds at time t2, then 
bo is not part of the bit of material b2 of which o consists 
at t2. 
4 RELEVANCE AND THE NORMATIVE 
Many of the concepts we are investigating have driven 
us inexorably to the problems of what is meant by 
"re levant"  and by "normative".  We do not pretend to 
have solved these problems. But for each of these 
concepts we do have the beginnings of an account hat 
can play a role in analysis, if not yet in implementation. 
Our view of relevance, briefly stated, is that some- 
thing is relevant o some goal if it is a part of a plan to 
achieve that goal. (A formal treatment of a similar view 
is given in Davies, forthcoming.) We can illustrate this 
with an example involving the word "sample" .  If a bit 
of material x is a sample of another bit of material y, 
then x is a part of y, and moreover, there are relevant 
properties p and q such that it is believed that ifp is true 
ofx  then q is true ofy.  That is, looking at the properties 
of the sample tells us something important about the 
properties of the whole. Frequently, p and q are the 
same property. In our target texts, the following sen- 
tence occurs: 
We retained an oil sample for future inspection. 
The oil in the sample is a part of the total lube oil in 
the lube oil system, and it is believed that a property of 
the sample, such as "contaminated with metal parti- 
cles", will be true of all the lube oil as well, and that this 
will provide information about possible wear on the 
bearings. It is therefore relevant o the goal of maintain- 
ing the machinery in good working order. 
We have arrived at the following provisional account 
of what it means to be "normat ive".  For an entity to 
exhibit a normative condition or behavior, it must first 
of all be a component of a larger system. This system 
has structure in the form of relations among its compo- 
nents. A pattern is a property of the system, namely, the 
property of a subset of these stuctural relations holding. 
A norm is a pattern established either by conventional 
stipulation or by statistical regularity. An entity behaves 
in a normative fashion if it is a component of a system 
and instantiates a norm within that system. The word 
"operate" ,  discussed in Section 3.6.3, illustrates this. 
When we say that an engine is operating, we have in 
mind a larger system - -  i.e., the device the engine 
drives - -  to which the engine may bear various possible 
relations. A subset of these relations is stipulated to be 
the norm - -  the way it is supposed to work. We say it is 
operating when it is instantiating this norm. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The research we have been engaged in has forced us to 
explicate a complex set of commonsense concepts. 
Since we have done it in as general a fashion as 
possible, we expect o be able, building on this founda- 
tion, to axiomatize a large number of other areas, 
including areas unrelated to mechanical devices. The 
very fact that we have been able to characterize words 
as diverse as " range" ,  " immediately",  br i tt le",  "ope- 
rate",  and "wear"  shows the promising nature of this 
approach. 
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